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Abstract. We describe an agent-based simulation of a fictional (but
feasible) information trading business. The Gas Price Information Trader
(GPIT) buys information about real-time gas prices in a metropolitan
area from drivers and resells the information to drivers who need to refuel
their vehicles.
Our simulation uses real world geographic data, lifestyle-dependent driv-
ing patterns and vehicle models to create an agent-based model of the
drivers. We use real world statistics of gas price fluctuation to create
scenarios of temporal and spatial distribution of gas prices. The price
of the information is determined on a case-by-case basis through a sim-
ple negotiation model. The trader and the customers are adapting their
negotiation strategies based on their historical profits.
We are interested in the general properties of the emerging informa-
tion market: the amount of realizable profit and its distribution between
the trader and customers, the business strategies necessary to keep the
market operational (such as promotional deals), the price elasticity of
demand and the impact of pricing strategies on the profit.
1 Introduction
In this paper we describe an agent-based simulation of a fictional (but feasible)
information trading business. The Gas Price Information Trader (GPIT) buys in-
formation about real-time gas prices in a metropolitan area from drivers, and re-
sells this information to drivers who need to refuel their vehicles. An autonomous
agent, potentially integrated with the vehicle’s onboard control system, can in
the near future perform all the actions associated with the driver, including the
acquisition of gas prices, selling and buying information and negotiating with
the trader.
Similar systems have been proposed previously [2,6], online webpages track-
ing gas prices currently exist (the ad-supported GasBuddy and GasPriceWatch
in the United States, the government-run FuelWatch in Western Australia).
These are related in spirit and operation to a large number of applications pro-
posed in the field of urban computing / citizen computing, which can be sim-
ilarly construed as information trading. While feasibility has been repeatedly
demonstrated, many of these systems have not been, in general, deployment
successes. We argue that the low deployment is due to the fact that voluntary
participation can be only maintained for projects with emotional and political
impact. Projects involving the environment, pollution, conservation can gather
significant following. A gas price reporting system, however, does not have an
emotional motivation for contribution, increasing the chance of free riding.
Instead of relying on voluntary participation, our system relies on the self
interest of the participants. We assume that the business is stable only if all the
participants profit financially over the long run. We are interested in the overall
market dynamics of the system.
To illustrate the operation of the system, let us consider the example in
Figure 1. A driver travels from work to home along the marked path. Near
Lake Burkett, the car signals low fuel. The driver has several nearby choices
for refueling: some of them are on his planned path, while others require short
detours. He contacts the GPIT and requires information about the cheapest
option in the vicinity. The GPIT obtains this information from its local database
which contains information it has acquired ahead of time from drivers. It will
provide this information for a price, which will be negotiated in real time.
Let us summarize the interests of the parties in this economic model:
i) The revenue of the GPIT is earned by selling information about the most
advantageous gas buying location near a trajectory. It incurs the cost of
buying the information necessary to keep the database up to date. The
GPIT tries to maximize its profits over the long term.
ii) The drivers, in the role of clients, are acquiring information to save on
the cost of gas. The amount of savings depends on many parameters: the
variation of the price among gas stations, the detour necessary to reach the
cheaper gas, the size of the gas tank, and so on. The savings are always
relative to the drivers default preference: if the GPIT instructs the driver
to go to the gas station where it would have gone anyhow, the savings are
zero.
The cost of the information will be negotiated by the driver and the GPIT.
The challenge here is that the parties need to negotiate without knowing
the savings which will be provided by the information.
The fact that the information was worthless in one instance does not guar-
antee that it will be the same the next time around as well. Our approach
will be to allow the client to estimate its savings considering a longer his-
tory, and to evaluate the benefits of dealing with the GPIT over a longer
timeframe as well.
iii) Drivers selling price information to the GPIT are trying to maximize their
income. Their costs are the cost of making the observation, communication
costs and the cost of privacy (as they need to disclose their location and
verify their identity).
From the point of view of the cost structure of its business, the GPIT is
similar to a software company: it has an initial cost to acquire the information,
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Fig. 1. Example scenario of interaction between a client and the GPIT
but subsequently, it can sell it an arbitrary number of times, without incurring
further costs (as long as the database is accurate).
What makes the GPIT business challenging is the difficulty in determining
the utility of the information to the user, the very large variation of the utility
from user to user, and, as we shall see, the variation of the utility over time
periods as well.
These considerations require us to consider a system where the cost of in-
formation is determined on a case by case basis, by a short negotiation process
between the user and the GPIT. Not all negotiations will be successful. In fact,
there will be clients who will effectively drop out from the system. This will hap-
pen if the clients estimate the utility of the information provided by the GPIT
to be zero (considering the driving habits and location of the client). The subset
of clients who will regularly purchase information depends on the pricing and
negotiation strategy of the GPIT. As we shall see, specific long term pricing
strategies such as promotional offers are also an important part of the system.
To understand the behavior of this system, we need a detailed simulation. The
system is only functional if it provides long term profits to all its participants.
But the profits of participants can depend on very arcane details: the driving
habits of the user, the variation of gas prices in a specific area, the default fueling
habits, the geographical distribution of the gas stations, the estimate of the GPIT
of the user’s profits, and so on. We also need to consider the social behavior of
the user: will it even consider negotiating again if for several consecutive times
the information was useless?
This paper presents the description and experimental validation of such a de-
tailed simulation. We use real world geographic data, lifestyle-dependent driving
patterns and vehicle models to create an agent-based model of the drivers. We
use real world statistics of gas price fluctuation to create scenarios of temporal
and spatial distribution of gas prices. The price of the information is determined
on a case-by-case basis through a simple negotiation model. The trader and
the customers are adapting their negotiation strategies based on their historical
profits.
We are interested in the general properties of the emerging information mar-
ket: the amount of realizable profit and its distribution between the trader and
customers, the business strategies necessary to keep the market operational (such
as promotional deals), the price elasticity of demand and the impact of pricing
strategies on the profit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
source of profits in the system. Section 3 describes the negotiation protocol
and the strategies used by the agents. Section 4 describes the modeling of the
environment and the market. An experimental study is shown in Section 5.
Section 6 discusses related work.
2 The source of the profits
As we discussed, the economic framework of the GPIT requires that all the par-
ticipants profit. Furthermore, all the participants express their profits in financial
term (not in goods or utility). This requires that the system has a constant inflow
of money.
The money in our system comes from the lost profits of gas stations. More
specifically, the gas stations will loose those profits which are due to the cus-
tomers lack of information about the variation of prices in time which are not
consistent with the spatial distribution and perceived quality.
Note that the lack of information is not always the reason for a customer
to choose more expensive gas. Sometimes we have a major brand with a local
discount station next to each other, with different advertised prices visible for
both. Both of them have clients because some clients are willing to pay for better
services and/or for better perceived quality of gas. This kind of price difference
is not a source of income for our system.
Similarly, temporal price variations which do not produce a reversal in the
ranking of optimal fueling station are also not a source of profit. If a specific
gas station is always the cheapest, this information has no financial worth for a
recurring customer.
Let us consider an example where a gas station realizes profits based on
the lack of information of its customers. Many airports are surrounded by gas
stations which charge a substantial premium over the prices prevalent in the
metropolitan area. These gas stations take advantage of the car rental companies’
requirements that the rental cars be returned with a full tank.
The rental car customers are frequently not well acquainted with the area
and have difficulty identifying the closest gas station with advantageous prices.
This lack of information is an important component of the gas station’s pricing
strategy; there are examples [9] of a gas station suing the city for the right not
to post its prices.
The major price differences for the airport gas stations are an extreme case.
Yet, statistical data shows that gas prices offer sufficient temporal and spatial
variability to provide an income to the GPIT economic system.
It is unclear whether the changing shopping patterns in a zone where a large
majority of buyers use the GPIT system would eliminate the arbitrage opportu-
nity. There is a reason to assume that only a subset of drivers would participate
in such a system, which would keep the information trading opportunities func-
tional.
3 Negotiating the price of information
3.1 The negotiation protocol
Let us consider a customer taking daily trips dictated by its schedule and
lifestyle, gradually exhausting the fuel in his car. When the quantity of fuel
drops below a certain level the customer will look for a gas station to refuel. The
current location and planned path of the customer has a significant impact on
which gas stations are the best refuelling choice.
To save on the cost of fuel by choosing the optimal gas station, the driver
contacts the GPIT, sends its location, planned path, and requests information
about the optimal gas station at the same time making a price offer x1c→s. The
GPIT calculates this information and replies with a counter offer x2c←s.
The negotiation Xmc↔s will consist of a series of exchanged offers {x
1
c→s, x
2
s←c
· · ·xnc↔s}. If the kth negotiation was successful, it will conclude with a deal v
k.
In this case, the client will pay vk dollars to the GPIT, and the GPIT will deliver
the information to the client (who will use it to choose the gas station to refuel).
If the negotiation concludes with the conflict deal, no money or information
is exchanged and the client will refuel at the first gas station on its projected
path. A full negotiation round without concession from either side breaks the
negotiation.
3.2 The customer’s negotiation strategy
The negotiation strategy of the client is a monotonic, uniform concession with
reservation price. The first offer made by the client is at umin, it will uniformly
concede with a concession rate δ ∈ (0, 0.5] until it reaches the reservation price
umax, at which point it will insist on its offer.
The customer’s negotiation strategy is framed by its expectations of benefits.
At the beginning of the negotiation the client will set a reservation price umax
which is the maximum limit it is willing to pay for the information. A natu-
ral limit would be the benefit the user could acquire at this moment: yet, not
having an information about the gas prices, the user can not exactly know this
information.
The user estimates that the information provided by the GPIT will save, in
average, the same amount it has saved in the past. It is not, however, a good
idea to set the reservation price umax to the exact estimate, because this will
terminate some negotiation which, after the real savings have been computed,
would have turned out to be profitable. With this strategy, the deal is xnc↔s ∈
(umin, umax].
The conflict offer set by the customer is twice the initial offer and is normally
distributed around the initial offer, i.e., ucmax = 2.u
c
min +N (µ, σ
2) where where
µ = 0 and σ2 = 1. Therefore, the cost of a deal is given as
cost(X kc↔s) = v
k =
{
xnc↔s if x
n
c→s ≥ u
s
min ∨ x
n
c←s ≤ u
c
max
0 otherwise
At the start of each negotiation the initial offer is dependent upon the pre-
vious r negotiations with the GPIT:
ucmin,k = [m ·
∑r
n=1 v
k−n
r
] + ucmin,k−1 · (1−m) (1)
where m = 0.125 bounds the initial offer to increment within one fourth of
previous negotiated deal. The limitation of the amount of history is justified by
the experimental fact that while recent negotiation experience can be a good
predictor of the current negotiation, older negotiations are not.
A parameter cumax limits the size of u
c
min such that the agent does not start
with a too high initial offer.
3.3 The trader’s negotiation strategy
The GPIT also uses a reservation price-based monotonic concession model as
its negotiation strategy. Its reservation price and concession step is determined
for each client and each negotiation using an adaptive learning process which
considers the history of previous negotiations. It uses exponential smoothing to
give more weight to the recent deals. Exponential moving average helps smooth
out the previous deals and provides GPIT with a trend following indicator for
the future negotiations. The initial offer from GPIT in start of kth negotiation
is
us,kmax = m · φ
k(r) + us,k−1max (1−m) (2)
where m = 0.125 and φk(r) is the exponential moving average of previous r
deals:
φk(r) = α · vk−1 + (1− α)φk−1(r) (3)
where, there control factor is chosen as α = 2 / (r + 1) providing more weight
to the recent negotiation.
If a customer is satisfied with the savings provided by the deals in preceding
negotiations, it will concede more in following negotiations. To model the gradual
change in the customers’ concession, the GPIT usesMoving Average Convergence
Divergence φkϕ(r) (MACD) [1]. This indicator provides a histogram with the
help of which GPIT estimates the concession behavior of the customer. The
histogram is obtained by computing the difference of two EMAs (of different
weights) against an EMA of the difference. The signal ϕ, i.e., difference between
two EMAs is given as:
ϕ = φ(9) − φ(15) (4)
The choice of using EMA’s of period 9 and 15 provide us with two differ-
ent windows required to compute the recent shift in momentum of negotiations.
Evaluating ϕ with brackets of 9 and 15 takes-in consideration the current nego-
tiations as well negotiations preceding it and these values have been determined
experimentally to provide a good match of the customer behavior (in stock mar-
ket analysis the values of 9, 12 and 26 day moving averages are used). The
concession step of GPIT δck is dependent upon ϕ and is given as
δck =
{
0.15 if ϕ < φkϕ(5)
0.25 else
(5)
In Figure 2, the signal ϕ shows the corresponding divergence or convergence
of the faster reactive φ(9) EMA from slower reactive EMA φ(15). MACD his-
togram models the gradual shift of the customer behavior and outputs a positive
indication on histogram if the customer is conceding more. The GPIT responds
to the faster concession rate of the customer by lowering its own concession rate
according to Equation 5 (and the reverse).
4 Environment modeling
As we have outlined, the economic model of GPIT is highly sensitive to the
environment conditions under which it operates. Profit margins are thin, at
best, the service might be useless for some clients, and depending on certain,
rather subtle conditions, the whole economic model might be inoperable.
To account for these factors, the environmental conditions under which the
system operates have been modeled based on real world data (and extrapolations
of it) and at a relatively high level of detail.
4.1 Modeling geography
We have chosen to model a relatively large area of East Orlando. This area has
a number of employers in education and high tech industry, as well as residen-
tial, shopping and recreation areas. It is a “driving city”: public transportation
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Fig. 2. Estimation of customer concession policy using MACD
options are virtually non-existent, the distances between areas are large and the
zoning restrictions frequently prevent the building of mixed use areas.
Our simulation uses the real world location of major employers in the area,
major residential and shopping areas. These areas have been identified as loca-
tions on Google Maps. The exact locations of the gas stations have been also
entered in the database. Driving directions and trip times have been acquired
from the Google Maps. The simulator was directly contacting the web service,
parsing the returned KML files, and caching them locally for reuse.
4.2 Modeling lifestyle
The lifestyle of East Orlando residents consists of well distinguished time pe-
riods spent at distinct locations, and driving between them. We have modeled
the lifestyle of our simulated clients by randomly assigning them workplaces and
residences. The clients were assumed to have an 8-to-5 work schedule on week-
days, not going to work on weekends, and a randomly distributed set of other
activities in the remaining time.
4.3 Scenario generation
The simulation of the economic system starts with a baseline scenario containing
the movement patterns of the clients, over the course of a year, assuming that
no refueling is needed. We assume that the variations of the price of the fuel do
not impact the in-city driving patterns of the users.
Running the economic model on this scenario will add the refueling times,
occasionally inserting small detours necessary to find the cheapest gas station.
The generated scenario is implemented as a series of events which represent
driving activities happening at specific locations and time.
Each event is described by (a) the participating agent, (b) the event type, (c)
the location, (d) the timestamp and (e) the distance travelled since the previous
event. An example subset of the scenario is shown in Listing 1.
The following event types are supported:
- “departs”: the client departed a location
- “arrives”: the client arrived at a location
- “sees”: the client passes near a landmark (typically, for our simulation, a gas
station
- “needs”: the vehicle needs fuel. This event is not in the baseline scenario,
but it is generated by the simulator
The location of the event is described by identifiers with standard pre-
fixes. These identifiers are then mapped to geographical locations by a separate
database. The prefix identifies the type of the location as follows: W - work, S -
Shopping, R - residential, STA - gas station.
The travel distance, used for “arrives” events, is calculated using Google
Maps queries for a suggested route from the latest departure location to the
current arrival location. The “sees” events are generated by comparing the land-
marks of STA type against the generated path.
The simulator maintains the quantity of gas available for the cars assuming a
fuel tank of 15 gallons, an average consumption of 25 miles/gallon. The “needs”
event is generated whenever the available fuel dips below 2 gallons. The location
of the “needs” event depends on the negotiation process with the GPIT, the
position of the refuelling and the possible detours taken by the drivers to refuel.
We assume that the driver always completely refills the tank.
4.4 Modeling gas prices
We have acquired our gas prices from the website GasBuddy.com, which works
as an urban portal for people who can participate in posting and reviewing gas
prices. Based on these prices (see Figure 4), we were able to generate a number
of fictional scenarios. To extrapolate the values we used a technique to scale the
spatial variance of the gas prices with an arbitrary factor, and added a Gaussian
noise component.
5 Experimental study and results
Our aim is to perform agent-based simulations to observe the general properties
of the information market. The GPIT simulator operates on the assumption that
7-Eleven || 2010 03 22 || 13:55
Shell || 2010 03 22 || 14:02
Eat at Maryland Fried chicken || 
2010 03 22 || 14:15
Fig. 3. Scenario Generated Map
Fig. 4. Gas price trend for the year 2009-2010 (Source-GasBuddy)
every customer contacts the GPIT when gas refill is required. For analyzing the
properties related to information market and GPIT we performed simulations,
observing the following quantities:
– Total income for the server
– The agreement price of negotiations
– Number of successful negotiations
5.1 Dynamic pricing analysis
Our first series of experiments verify if the dynamic price formation mechanism
operates as expected. Our expectation is that the strategies deployed by the cus-
tomers and the trader interact in such a way that they will agree on a price level
where both the customers and the trader will profit over the long run. Figure 5
shows the histogram of the distributions of the agreed price for successful nego-
tiations. We find that the prices show a relatively wide distribution around the
value of $3 / information. This is consistent with the variation of the gas prices
and the potential savings of the customers filling their 15 gallon gas tanks.
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Fig. 5. Dynamic pricing analysis
5.2 Price elasticity analysis using fixed initial price
Figure 6 shows the ratio of successful negotations for a fixed initial offer by the
trader ranging in the interval usmax = [$0..$7]. The conflict offer was set to u
c
min
= ucmax/3, and the concession rate was fixed at δ
c = 0.25.
For the information offered for free (i.e. the promotional offer), the negoti-
ation is always successful. Paradoxically, the highest success ratio is obtained
at initial price settings which match the approximately $3 value which is the
average value of the dynamically determined price.
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5.3 Profits obtained using fixed prices
Figure 7 shows the profits of the trader obtained using a fixed initial offer. We
observe the rachet effect [7] where even at higher prices some customers are
willing to pay for the price of information yet the total profit is very low. If we
compare the profits that are obtained using dynamic pricing as seen in Figure 5,
we see that it is not feasible for the GPIT to operate using non-variable prices.
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6 Related work
6.1 Agent-based markets
Kasbah [4] developed by MIT Labs, was one of the first and simplest agent based
market in which customers delegate agents on their behalf to do one-to-one nego-
tiations for market goods. In [3] the same group used a slightly modified version of
their previous market-place implementation and performed real-life experiments.
Sim [12,?] discusses a model for negotiating agents that is driven by dynamic
markets. In his framework, he argues that dynamic-market requires different
tactics when compared to static market and hence, variable adapting behavior
should incorporated for dynamic-market. The authors of Genoa [11] provide an
agent based simulated financial market place. They assign certain probabilities to
a trader for buying or selling. The traders are merged using graph theory, where
any pair of randomly selected traders form a cluster. The decision of agent in
this market is constrained by avaliable resources where the total avaliable cash
is conserved. NetBazaar [14] provides a distributed marketplace for information
products. Besides providing an infrastructure for information market they have
also provided the support of federation. The main idea behind federation is to
link different trade systems for information sharing and perform trading on be-
half of each other. An agent based urban economic market is presented in [10].
The design involves interaction between multiple customers and sellers where the
price is based on variance in neighbourhood locality and other factors like spa-
tial properties. An agent based commodity trading scenario was demonstrated
by authors in [5]. Though the authors were able to simulate the market scenario
based on a single commodity yet it lacked the real world data. The simulations
were completely based on fictitious values by using statistical methods.
6.2 Price discrimination in information markets
Varian [15] discusses different forms of price discrimination that takes place in
an information market. Initially he discusses “mass customization” or “personal-
ization” where price of information is solely dependent upon a monopolist seller.
Amazon was accused of using similar variable pricing [8]. The second type of
discrimination also known as “product line pricing”, “versioning” or “market
segmentation” uses the distribution of consumers feedback for conditioning the
price. The third discrimination is widely used and based upon selling information
at different prices to different groups. We use the form of price discrimination
that is based on conditioning using deal price history [7].
6.3 Promotional offers in information markets
Promotional offers holds significance in information marketplace [13]. Promo-
tional offers involve a considerable amount of investment to gain attention of
desired customers. This can subsequently turn into profits if customers find the
information useful.
7 Conclusion
This paper described the agent-based simulation of an information trading busi-
ness where a trader agent buys and sells information about savings opportunities
in gas prices. This is a low margin business where only a subset of customers
can benefit from the savings opportunity, and only with a favorable rate of the
information cost. Our our approach was to model the system in relatively high
detail, including the geography of the area, the lifestyle choices of the customers,
the spatial and temporal distribution of the gas prices. We have assumed that
the agents are negotiating the price of the information on a case-by-case basis;
their negotiation strategy is affected by their negotiation history. A promotional
offer is used to establish the initial history necessary for efficient negotiation.
Our experimental study shows that the proposed economic model is viable.
The negotiation approaches, as designed, are efficient in finding the price ranges
which ensure profits for both the trader and the clients, and the price/profit
curve shows stable shapes with a maximum profit for the trader for a price of
information around $3.
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